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I. Introduction
In late 2015, the European Commission announced what can only be characterised as a monumental U-turn on VAT rates policy. 1 After decades of advocating the benefits of harmonisation and rationalisation of VAT rates across the EU Member States, and after many failed legislative attempts at achieving it, the Commission has announced its intention to do the opposite, namely to disharmonise VAT rates across Europe. 2 The announcement was followed by the VAT Action Plan, 3 and a public consultation on the reform of VAT rates, 4 which, under the guise of modernisation and consistency with the destination principle, 5 presented two options for reform, both of which would give Member States further freedom and flexibility in the application of reduced rates. Under the first option the list of goods and services eligible for reduced rates would be extended and reviewed regularly so as to adapt existing rules to the modern economy, and evolving political priorities. The second option envisages the abolition of the pre-defined list of goods and services to which reduced rates can be applied, as part of a * Professor of tax law at the University of Leeds, and future pupil barrister at 3 Paper Buildings, London, respectively. decentralised system, 6 under which Member States would be free to set their domestic reduced rates and to apply them to their choice of goods and services.
Against this background, the aim of this article is not to restate the benefits of VAT rate harmonisation, 7 but to assess whether the EU has legislative competence to approve disharmonising VAT legislation. Competence to approve VAT legislation is conferred upon the EU by Article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides the legal basis "for the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes" subject to specific conditions. The key question, therefore, which has not been addressed within the ongoing debate, is whether disharmonising legislation of the type being considered for VAT rates, respects those conditions.
In the second part of this article, the background to the current proposals will be discussed, with consideration given to the various attempts to harmonise VAT rates prior to 2015, as well as to the political economy dynamics that have always permeated discussions regarding VAT rates, particularly since the 2008/2009 financial crisis. In the third part of this article, the EU competence under Article 113 TFEU is considered, with particular regard to the link between the legislative competence conferred therein and the aim to establish an EU Internal Market. The article concludes that Article 113 TFEU could not be used as a legal basis for a Directive aimed at disharmonising VAT rates, and that any such Directive, therefore, would lack legal basis and be consequently unlawful under the EU constitutional principle of conferral of powers.
II. EU Harmonisation of VAT Rates
The harmonisation of rates has been a point of contention for the EU VAT system since its inception. 8 The early Directives established only a basic framework, affording Member States full autonomy over the numbers and levels of their rates, and the Sixth VAT Directive, approved in 1977, 9 had limited impact, focussing primarily on harmonisation of the base rather than the rates, given the inability to reach agreement on the latter. In the decade that followed the approval of the Sixth VAT Directive, progress in achieving further harmonisation remained slow, and until the late 1980s only three VAT legislative proposals of significance reached agreement, none of which concerned harmonisation of rates. 10 The second attempt to harmonise rates came in the late 1980s, following the European Commission's presentation of the White Paper on the completion of the Internal Market. 11 The White Paper concluded that a close level of 'approximation' within VAT was required in order to establish a true internal market, and that the abolition of 6 "Option 2: Abolition of the list" in fn. 3 above. 7 physical frontiers required, in particular, further harmonisation of rates. 12 The Commission's follow-up legislation proposal in 1987 was widely regarded as ambitious, 13 calling for a dual-rate system, a compulsory list of goods and services to which reduced rates could apply, and the repeal of temporary derogations. The proposal was met with significant political opposition, as was an alternative proposal tabled in 1989. 14 In the early 1990s, the then designated transitional VAT system was born, and some much diluted rules on the harmonisation of rates were finally approved in the Approximation of VAT Rates Directive. 15 The new Directive, which was largely a product of political compromise, 16 prescribed, inter alia, a lower limit of 15% for the standard rate, and of 5% for reduced rates applicable to a list of specific goods and services; and a standstill clause that allows the temporary maintenance of several exceptions to those rules, including the application of a zero rate to the products taxed as such before 1 January 1991, or the application of reduced rates to products not listed. Table   1 below provides a comparative overview of the three proposed VAT rate structures. and assess the VAT rate structure, reporting that reduced rates and their complexity was the primary cause of requests and questions received, but ultimately all initiatives to simplify and rationalise rates (including, most notably, the 2003 proposal) failed miserably. 19 It is of further significance that during this period, rate structures across the EU not only continued to vary considerably but did so increasingly, which, to a large extent, was due to the labour intensive services experiment, which despite having failed to achieve its objective of reducing unemployment in those industries, 20 became a permanent feature of the EU VAT system in 2008. 21 The move, which whilst increasing differentiation did not constitute disharmonisation per se, recognised the strong political will to maintain reduced rates, emphasising that some flexibility could be afforded as long as it respected Article 93 of the [then] ECT (now Article 113 TFEU), which required this flexibility to be balanced against the need to ensure the continued proper functioning of the Internal Market. 22 In 2008, in the wake of the economic and financial crisis and after a prior period of relative stability since 1996, the EU average standard rate of VAT started to rise, and several Member States made substantial broadening amendments to their VAT base, moving goods and services from the reduced to intermediate rate, or from the reduced and intermediate to the standard rates. Overall, a staggering twenty-three out of the twenty-eight EU countries changed their VAT rate structures post-2008. 23 These uncoordinated movements at a national level raised the expectation / possibility that decreased divergence and even approximation of VAT rates structures across the EU may happen; not through a process of EU harmonisation, but instead through a process of natural convergence of national VAT policies. 24 Alas, this was not to be.
Over the years, several Member States expressed reservations over the harmonisation of rates, but it is undeniable that within the realpolitik of EU policy circles, the UK has played a significant role in determining the fate of the collapsed initiatives, as demonstrated by their cri de coeur in relation to children's clothing, 25 which the Commission-backed by evidence-quickly dismissed. 26 More than merely blocking further harmonisation, it was suggested that it had, for some time, been the desire of a selection of UK Members of Parliament to see the country provided with the flexibility to apply reduced rates to those goods and services which the UK Parliament deems appropriate, as and when it deems it appropriate. 27 This is the first of several ironies regarding the role of the UK in EU VAT rates policy: that whilst national court decisions on disputes regarding the interpretation of VAT reduced rates rules multiplied, continuously and consistently highlighting limitations of the current rules on VAT rates; 28 the political debate was firmly centred on the need to expand the scope of reduced rates, and further erode the base.
Nowhere was this more evident than in the debate which ensued in 2015 regarding what became known as the tampon tax: the possible application of reduced rates of VAT to women sanitary products. 29 Few could have predicted, however, the impact that this debate would have on EU VAT rates policy.
Ongoing consultation
For the last four decades, the European Commission's approach to VAT rates had been to convince Member
States that harmonisation was essential for the establishment and the functioning of the European Internal Market.
Yet, neither promises of trade benefits of harmonisation, nor evidence of domestic economic efficiency, nor even the appeal for consolidation of public finances, could surpass the political pressure of maintaining, or even extending, the scope of reduced rates. 30 Now, and only months after success in the CJEU against an errant UK reduced-rate, 31 the Commission performed a remarkable volte-face.
With the stated aim of giving more flexibility in the application of reduced rates, the 2015 Action Plan outlined two options for reform of the EU VAT rate structure. The first option is to extend the list of goods and services eligible for reduced rates. This would maintain the 15% standard rate and the current list but have regular reviews of the products included therein to take into account political priorities of the Member States, with any potential changes assessed on the basis of their risk to the functioning of the single market and to competition. This is the less revolutionary option, which would limit the nevertheless unavoidable increase in rate differentiation; however, it is also unclear what the benefits of such a system would be when compared to the status quo, in particular given that the Action Plan is silent as to the details of the process by which the European Commission would assess future requests for review of the list. The second option is the more radical approach: proposing to abolish the list of goods and services eligible for reduced rates, remove the minimum standard rate, and give Member States, prima facie, freedom in their application of VAT rates. It is suggested that, in order to prevent unfair tax competition in cross-border shopping and the narrow targeting of sectors for "unfair tax relief", the Commission may, nevertheless, limit the total number of reduced rates applicable in each Member State.
The public consultation begins with a discussion on the objective of the consultation. It argues that the framework was established for a definitive, origin-based denouement which necessitated rate uniformity and that the abandonment of the definitive system for an improved destination-based system allows for greater rate differentiation, opening up the possibility of reform to the rules on rates to make them less constraining on Member States.
The harmonisation of rates has been the bête noir of EU VAT policy throughout its existence. As to why the Commission changed its mind, many may speculate. There are numerous potential triggers, from the need to adapt to modern technologies and new goods or markets, 32 to the number of rates cases clogging the CJEU dockets, 33 and interpretative difficulties arising from the need to balance the inherent conflict between the fundamental principle of strict interpretation of exceptions to the base and the principle of fiscal neutrality. 34 The truth is probably rather more prosaic, however: faced with decades of resistance and increasing pressure from Member States to allow exceptions to existing rules, the Commission finally broke the political impasse in the context of the tampon tax, 35 ceding power in the favour of the Member States.
A detailed assessment of the (de)merits of such a shift in the legislative paradigm are beyond the scope of this article. As a mere compendium, if disharmonisation is to be permitted, not only is differentiation set to increase, but crucially, once the bureaucratic shackles are discarded, the "creeping exemptions" phenomenon will flourish, 36 further eroding the tax base. This is discussed in more depth in a previous paper, but needless to say the potential consequences to the internal market are sobering. 37 EU-wide complexity is likely to increase-potentially deterring trade; market distortions will proliferate as competing products are treated differently; and the eroded base will reduce nationals and EU budgetary pots. Domestically, reduced revenue would be compounded with costs in administering a protean patchwork of rates; industries will lack certainty with potential for increased changes that will likely favour the most vocal and well-resourced lobbyists, compliance costs will increase accordingly; there is a potential for fraud and aggressive planning to be incentivised; it may distract from redistributive measures within the direct tax system; and there will certainly be increased definitional litigation. Yet, Eurosceptic Conservative MPs in the UK have, bizarrely, still criticised the Action Plan for steering towards "more rigidity, harmonisation and uniformity." 38 Whilst the impetus of the economic and budgetary imperative on harmonisation has been noted, 39 this would be a factor with or without the legislative backbone, and in that context, the Action Plan can hardly be seen to be proactively promoting harmonisation. Regardless, the focus of this paper is not upon the potential economic effects of disharmonisation of VAT rates, but rather on the legality of such a move. the list. Both represent different degrees of the flexibility that could be granted to Member States, which imply a reduction in harmonisation levels, even if harmonisation were to occur extrinsically. 44 This is particularly so in the case of Option 2, which would seek to impose the elimination of harmonising EU measures, and their substitution by national measures. Neither option could therefore be said to reflect provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning VAT. Any legislation would be, arguably, outside the EU competence, as set out in Article 113 TFEU.
III. EU Legislative Competence on VAT
This conclusion is further reiterated by considering the second substantive limit set out therein, namely that the legislation is aimed at ensuring the establishment and functioning of the internal market and avoiding distortions in competition. This limit to harmonising legislation permits an area of wiggle room for competition between legal orders, for uniformity of law in itself is not an objective, but can be justified by the necessity of a level playing field in the internal market. 45 In practice it means that, as it has been noted before, the Union's legislative competence on VAT, as it other areas, is to a great extent dependent and limited by the concept of internal market, 46 a term which is highly significant within the EU legal and political context, but which remains nonetheless uncertain in scope and meaning. 47 For the last 25 years, however, the CJEU sought to clarify the concept, in a line of caselaw that started with the decision in Titanium Dioxide, 48 where the Court adopted a broad, and at the time controversial, 49 definition of the internal market, to include the elimination of distortions to competition -thereby sparking a common constitutional power struggle in polities of enumerated powers. 50 This decision was codified in subsequent Treaty amendments, and Article 113 now has the express addition of "avoiding distortions in competition" in its wording.
The landmark judgment in Tobacco Advertising followed just under a decade later. 51 The case concerned a Directive on the approximation of the domestic laws relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products, adopted as a harmonising, internal market measure, which was disputed by Germany on the grounds of lack of competence. The Applicant (Germany) contended, inter alia, that the proposed measure created new obstacles to trade, and that measures "must actually contribute to the improvement of the internal market" if what is now Article 115 TFEU was to be used as a legal basis for its approval. The Court agreed, affirming recourse to that Article as a legal basis, "is possible if the aim is to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from multifarious development of national laws. However, the emergence of such obstacles must be likely and the measure in question must be designed to prevent them." 52 Particularly significant in that case is also the preceding Opinion of AG Fennelly, in which a bipartite test was proffered in order to determine whether an EU measure pursued internal market objectives. 53 First, it must be it must be ascertained whether the preconditions for harmonisation exist, that is, disparate national laws which either constitute barriers to the exercise of the four freedoms or distort conditions of competition in an economic sector;
second, the action taken by the Union must either intend to eliminate those barriers or distortions. 54 The Court did not explicitly refer to this test but essentially followed the reasoning with a few additional qualifications. In Tobacco Advertising the above criteria were scattered throughout the judgment-and the Opinion-in a relatively unsystematic fashion, but the Court has moved towards a more consistently expressed formula in Vodafone. 55 These decisions provided not only some clarification on the internal market concept but, crucially also, on the limits to the use of Article 113 as a legal basis. As it follows from the decisions of the Court, that this provision cannot be equated with creation of a general power to regulate the functioning of VAT within the internal market. The legislative competences set out therein are exclusively to remove obstacles to the fundamental freedoms resulting from divergences in national VAT laws, or equalise the conditions of competition within the internal market insofar as VAT is concerned; any measure adopted thereunder must genuinely have as its object the improvement of conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market with the aim of preventing obstacles to trade. 56 It also follows from the decisions, read in conjunction with the Opinion of AG Fennelly, that the exercise of these powers necessitates the presence of two cumulative conditions, namely: the existence of disparities in VAT law that constitute barriers to the fundamental freedoms; and the intention of the proposed action to be the removal of those disparities. Pursuant to Article 113, therefore, the Council may only adopt provisions harmonising the VAT system, which have their centre of gravity in the removal of disparities in VAT law that constitute barriers to the fundamental freedoms or that create appreciable barriers to competition.
Action Plan
The legality of the most recent Directive on VAT rates, approved in 2009, is contestable. Indeed, to the extent that it resulted in an increase in disparities in national VAT rules, 57 it could be said to have fallen short of the substantive limits set out in Article 113 TFEU, and thus lacking legal basis for its approval. However, both options for reform of the EU VAT rates system now under consideration pursuant to the Action Plan go much further, allowing for a significantly higher level of differentiation amongst national VAT laws. As such, it is argued that both options under consideration would, if pursued, result in legislation which would fall short of the substantive requirements set out in Article 113 TFEU, since neither would be, as follows: 
IV. Conclusion
In 1985, when launching the Internal Market programme, the European Commission appealed directly to the political will of the Member States:
"What this White Paper proposes, therefore, is that the Community should now take a further step along the road so clearly delineated in the Treaties. To do less would be to fall short of the ambitions of the founders of the Community, incorporated in the Treaties; it would be to betray the trust invested in us; and it would be to offer the peoples of Europe a narrower, less rewarding, less secure, less prosperous future than they could, otherwise, enjoy. That is the measure of the challenge which faces us. Let it never be said that we were incapable of rising to it." 59
Yet the political dynamics of tax policy are such that the instrumental nature of both EU legislation and CJEU jurisprudence is often forgotten, and the instrument becomes the end in itself. As Figure 1 neutrality and a level-playing field, thus establishing a true European Internal Market, 60 that will in turn result in increased welfare and economic growth. 61
FIGURE 1: The EU constitutional instrumental chain
The Treaties, and principally Article 113 TFEU, do not confer upon the EU unlimited powers to legislate on VAT, but confer only the necessary powers to approve legislation that will further the establishing an EU Internal Market.
Neither legislation intended at merely regulating the internal market nor legislation that will undermine the internal market by decreasing neutrality or the level-playing field, fall within the jurisdictive purview.
Regardless of any economic considerations on the potential negative effects of disharmonisation of VAT rates, the European Commission's Action Plan fails to acknowledge, by putting forward these proposals, the inherent constitutional constraints to which the EU legislative power is subject. The EU simply lacks the power to approve VAT legislation of the type being now considered. Furthermore, approving such legislation is not only unlawful, it constitutes a fundamental betrayal of the trust invested upon the EU institutions to offer the peoples of Europe a more prosperous future; for that is the challenge to which one should always aim to rise. 60 The instrumental nature of the fundamental freedoms to the realisation of the internal market has been expressly recognised by the Court in case C-265/95, Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:1997:595, at para 30; see also P. 
